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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the in-
fluence of corporate governance on intellectual
capital disclosure in corporate annual reports, con-
trolling for other firm characteristics. Intellectual
capital is increasingly recognised as having much
greater significance in creating and maintaining
competitive advantage and shareholder value
(Tayles et al., 2007). Definitions of intellectual
capital vary (for example, Stewart, 1997; Mouritsen,
1998). One of the most comprehensive definitions
of intellectual capital is offered by CIMA (2001):
‘… the possession of knowledge and experience,
professional knowledge and skill, good relation-
ships, and technological capacities, which when
applied will give organisations competitive advan-
tage.’ Sveiby (1997) suggests that the concept of
intellectual capital can be categorised into human,
structural and organisational capital, while Guthrie
and Petty (2000) offer an alternative categorisa-
tion: internal structure, external structure and
human capital. The various forms of intellectual
capital disclosure are valuable information for in-
vestors as they help reduce uncertainty about fu-
ture prospects and facilitate a more precise
valuation of the company (Bukh, 2003). However,
financial reports fail to reflect such a wide range of
value-creating intangible assets (Lev and Zarowin,
1999), giving rise to increasing information asym-
metry between firms and users (Barth et al., 2001),
and creating inefficiencies in the resource alloca-
tion process within capital markets.
A number of research reports (e.g. FASB, 2001;
ASB, 2007) and academic studies (e.g. Lev, 2001;
Mouritsen et al., 2001) have called for greater dis-
closure of non-financial indicators of investment
in intangible assets. Cañibano et al. (2000) argue that
the cost associated with a radical change in the ac-
counting system to make it more value relevant for
intellectual capital intensive firms is unaffordable
and that the sensible approach towards the en-
hancement of financial reports is to encourage vol-
untary disclosure of intellectual capital information.
Keenan and Aggestam (2001) argue that respon-
sibility for the prudent investment of intellectual
capital resides with corporate governance, and
that, depending on the firm’s characteristics and
orientation, the governance of publicly-owned
firms may need to develop new structures and
processes in annual reports for communicating in-
formation about the value created for stakeholders
through the firm’s intellectual capital. However, as
discussed in a later section, the empirical evidence
from prior studies is limited, with small sample
sizes prohibiting more rigorous statistical analysis
and external validity. For example, we know very
little about the main determinants of the variation
in levels of intellectual capital disclosure in annu-
al reports across firms, including the effects of
good governance mechanisms.
This paper examines the influence of corporate
governance factors on intellectual capital disclo-
sure, and the subcategories comprising it, using
various disclosure measures. We hypothesise that
significant relationships exist between intellectual
capital disclosure in annual reports and board com-
position, role duality, ownership concentration,
audit committee size and frequency of audit com-
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mittee meetings, controlling for listing age, firm
size and profitability. Using content analysis and
regressing the three forms of intellectual capital
disclosure measures on the explanatory variables,
we find support for all hypotheses with the excep-
tion of role duality.
The remainder of this paper is organised as fol-
lows: the next section reviews the empirical litera-
ture on intellectual capital disclosure. The
hypothesis development is outlined in Section 3,
followed by the research design in Section 4.
Section 5 presents findings on intellectual capital
disclosure practices from multiple regression
analyses, and examines the working hypotheses.
Finally, Section 6 discusses the findings, implica-
tions and limitations of the study.
2. Literature on intellectual capital 
disclosure studies
Information on intellectual capital is important to
stakeholders in their decision-making. Within an
agency context, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue
that greater disclosure reduces the uncertainty 
facing investors and thus reduces a firm’s cost of 
capital. Managers should therefore be willing to dis-
close intellectual capital information in order to en-
hance the firm’s value by providing investors with a
better assessment of the financial position of the
firm and help reduce the volatility of stock returns.
Barth et al. (2001) observe that analyst coverage is
greater for firms investing more heavily in research
and development and advertising, while empirical
studies suggest a positive share price impact arises
from specific intellectual capital indicators such 
as research and development (R&D) expenditure
(Amir and Lev, 1996), capitalisation of software de-
velopment expenditure (Aboody and Lev, 1998),
and customer satisfaction (Ittner and Larker, 1998).
Gibbins et al. (1990) explore the voluntary dis-
closure process giving rise to disclosure outputs in
response to internal and external stimuli. They
argue that a company’s readiness to disclose is a
function of its general disclosure position (for ex-
ample, an uncritical adherence to information dis-
closure norms or to use disclosure as opportunity
to gain advantage or boost stock price), antecedents
(for example, corporate history, corporate strategy,
and market factors), structure, and the use of con-
sultants and advisors. While corporate governance
mechanisms are not specifically identified, they
have relevance to all these independent variables,
particularly to structure, where governance in-
volves the establishing of clear policies.
Abeysekera (2006) observes that the develop-
ment of a theoretical framework underlying intel-
lectual capital disclosure is in its infancy, with few
studies providing a strong theoretical basis for in-
terpreting their findings. However, the literature
offers a few theoretical perspectives that may help
explain the variation of intellectual capital disclo-
sure. These include arguments based on legitima-
cy and stakeholders (Abeysekera and Guthrie,
2005), signalling (García-Meca and Martínez,
2005), media agenda setting (Sujan and
Abeysekera, 2007), agency (Patelli and Prencipe,
2007), and information asymmetry (Amir and Lev,
1996).
In a review of the current state of financial and
external reporting research, Parker (2007) identi-
fied intellectual capital accounting as a major area
for further research. Most intellectual capital dis-
closure studies are cross-sectional and country
specific. Examples include studies in Australia
(e.g. Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Sujan and
Abeysekera, 2007), Ireland (Brennan, 2001), Italy
(e.g. Bozzolan et al., 2003), Malaysia (Goh and
Lim, 2004), UK (e.g. Williams, 2001), and Canada
(Bontis, 2003). Relatively few longitudinal studies
have been reported (e.g. Abeysekera and Guthrie,
2005). Some studies focus on specific aspects of
intellectual capital disclosure, such as human cap-
ital reporting (e.g. Subbarao and Zeghal, 1997),
while others conduct international comparative
studies (e.g. Vergauwen and van Alem, 2005;
Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). Some intellectual
capital disclosure studies have looked beyond an-
nual reports to examine other communication
channels such as analyst presentations (García-
Meca et al., 2005).
Most intellectual capital disclosure studies em-
ploy content analysis as the research method, but
some use questionnaire surveys (e.g. Bontis,
1998). Guthrie and Petty’s (2000) analysis of in-
tellectual capital reporting practices suggests that
disclosure has been expressed in discursive rather
than numerical terms and that little attempt has
been made to translate the rhetoric into measures
that enable performance of various forms of intel-
lectual capital to be evaluated.
Studies have also been conducted to explore in-
tellectual capital related issues from the firm’s per-
spective. Chaminade and Roberts (2003)
investigate the implementation of intellectual cap-
ital reporting systems in Norway and Spain.
Habersam and Piper (2003) employ case studies to
explore the relevance and awareness of intellectu-
al capital in hospitals. Studies that looked at possi-
ble determinants of voluntary intellectual capital
disclosure include García-Meca et al. (2005) and
Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007). Based on analyst
presentation reports of listed Spanish companies,
García-Meca et al. (2005) found significant asso-
ciation between intellectual capital disclosure and
size and type of disclosure meeting but not owner-
ship diffusion, international listing status, industry
type and profitability. Based on analysis of
European Biotechnology companies over a period
of three years, Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007)
138 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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found governance related variables to strongly in-
fluence voluntary intellectual capital disclosure.
In the UK, there has been a limited number of in-
tellectual capital disclosure studies compared to its
European counterparts. Williams (2001) conduct-
ed a cross-sectional study of 31 companies while
Beattie et al. (2002) undertook a study of 11 com-
panies in the food sector. The small sample sizes
restrict generalisation and meaningful interpreta-
tion of intellectual capital disclosure. Roslender
and Fincham (2004) explore intellectual capital
awareness among UK firms, and the reasons and
motives underlying such interest.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the liter-
ature on the determinants of intellectual capital
disclosure is limited and inconclusive. Our study
builds on the previous literature of intellectual cap-
ital disclosure practice within a UK context and
examines its relationship with corporate gover-
nance structures, listing age, profitability and size.
3. Determinants of intellectual capital 
disclosure and development of hypotheses
Corporate governance mechanisms
Corporate governance is a framework of legal,
institutional, and cultural factors shaping the pat-
terns of influence that stakeholders exert on mana-
gerial decision-making (Weimer and Pape, 1999).
The justification for considering corporate gover-
nance is that the board of directors manages infor-
mation disclosure in annual reports and therefore
constituents of boards may be important. Holland
(2006a: 147) found that boards of directors are at
the heart of corporate financial communications,
having active roles in the disclosure process relat-
ed to: (1) the provision of primary information re-
garding the corporate value-creation process, and
their contribution towards it; (2) the provision of
information about themselves in terms of their
skills in managing the business; (3) the manner in
which they are organised to conduct financial
communications; (4) their reputation for disclo-
sure honesty; and (5) information about how their
own pay and wealth is tied to company fortunes.
Agency theory provides a framework for linking
voluntary disclosure behaviour to corporate gover-
nance, whereby control mechanisms are designed
to reduce the agency problem arising from the sep-
aration between ownership and management
(Welker, 1995). This argument can be extended to
intellectual capital disclosure, whereby manage-
ment can determine the level of disclosure and
thereby reduce investor uncertainty relating to the
impact of intellectual capital on the firm’s value.
High intellectual capital disclosure is therefore ex-
pected to provide a more intensive monitoring
package for a firm to reduce opportunistic behav-
iour and information asymmetry.
Adoption of internal control devices, such as
audit committees and non-executive directors, and
separation of the roles of chairman and chief exec-
utive, may enhance monitoring quality in critical
decisions about intellectual capital investment and
performance (Keenan and Aggestam, 2001). This
is likely to reduce the scope for managerial oppor-
tunism and reduce benefits from withholding in-
formation, and, as a consequence, intellectual capital
disclosure in annual reports should be improved.
Board composition – proportion of independent
non-executive directors (INED)
The board of directors is an internal control
mechanism intended to take decisions on behalf of
the shareholders and to ensure that management
behaviour is consistent with owners’ interests.
Based on resource dependence theory, Haniffa and
Cooke (2005) argue for more non-executive direc-
tors on the board as they can provide wider ex-
pertise, prestige and contacts, and play a key role
in influencing disclosure. Extending this argu-
ment, and that of Gibbins et al. (1990), to intellec-
tual capital, we suggest that the wider expertise
and experience of non-executive directors on the
board will encourage management to take a dis-
closure position beyond a ritualistic, uncritical ad-
herence to prescribed norms, to a more proactive
position reflecting the value relevance of intellec-
tual capital to stakeholders.
Findings from prior voluntary disclosure studies
that considered board composition as a possible
determinant of voluntary disclosure are mixed;
some find that the proportion of non-executive di-
rectors is positively related with the board’s abili-
ty to influence voluntary disclosure decisions (e.g.
Beasley, 1996; Chen and Jaggi, 2000), others find
no relationship (Ho and Wong, 2001; Brammer
and Pavelin, 2006), and yet others observe a nega-
tive relationship (Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and
Cooke, 2005). One reason may be that non-execu-
tive directors are not necessarily independent.
Independent non-executive directors are typically
individuals with relevant expertise and profession-
al reputations to defend, with no management role
or links with the company.1 Cotter and Silvester
Vol. 38 No. 2. 2008 139
1 The revised Combined Code (2006) recommends that at
least half of the board, excluding the chairman, should com-
prise non-executive directors determined by the board to be
independent as defined by criteria in the Code, in order that
non-executive directors are able to discharge their responsibil-
ities in an objective manner, without interference, bias or
favouritism. For example, a director should not have been an
employee of the group within the last five years, had a mate-
rial business relationship with the company within the last
three years, received additional remuneration from the compa-
ny apart from a director’s fee, participate in the company’s
share option or a performance-related pay scheme, close fam-
ily ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior
employees, hold cross-directorships or significant links with
directors, or served on the board for more than nine years.
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(2003) argue that independent non-executive di-
rectors are in a better position to monitor executive
management. In one of the few studies capturing
independent non-executive directors, Patelli and
Prencipe (2007) found a positive correlation with
the amount of voluntary information disclosed by
companies in their annual reports. We also capture
independent non-executive directors (INED) and
argue that:
H1: There is a positive relationship between the
level of intellectual capital disclosure and
the proportion of independent non-executive
directors to the total number of directors on
the board, ceteris paribus.
Role duality (RDUAL)
Another way to examine independence of the
board is to consider role duality, a board leadership
structure in which the same person undertakes
both the roles of chief executive and chairman.2
There is widespread acknowledgement that a dom-
inant personality commanding a firm may be detri-
mental to the interests of shareholders, and this
phenomenon has been found to be associated with
poor disclosure (Forker, 1992) and CEO entrench-
ment, resulting in ineffective monitoring of mana-
gerial opportunistic behaviour (Haniffa and
Cooke, 2002). Concentration of decision-making
power resulting from role duality could impair the
board’s oversight and governance roles, including
disclosure policies. Separation of the two roles
provides the essential checks and balances on
management behaviour (Blackburn, 1994), as rec-
ommended in the revised Combined Code (2006).3
Employing similar arguments for role duality as
for independent non-executives, we hypothesise
that:
H2: There is a negative relationship between the
level of intellectual capital disclosure and
role duality, ceteris paribus.
Ownership structure – share concentration
(SCON)
The power of stakeholders to influence manage-
ment is a function of the resources they control
that are essential to the corporation (Smith et al.,
2005). Ownership structure therefore will influ-
ence the level of monitoring and thereby the level
of voluntary disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003).
Agency theory argues that with greater ownership
diffusion, firms are more likely to experience pres-
sure from shareholders for greater disclosure to re-
duce agency costs and information asymmetry
(Raffournier, 1995). In contrast, firms with close-
ly-held ownership are expected to have less infor-
mation asymmetry between management and
dominant shareholders who typically have access
to the information they need and can provide an
active governance system that is difficult for
smaller, more passive and less-informed investors
(Cormier et al., 2005).4 This is particularly rele-
vant to intellectual capital disclosure because fund
managers have access to such information via pri-
vate communication channels (Holland, 2006b).
Hence, we hypothesise that:
H3: There is a negative relationship between the
level of intellectual capital disclosure and
concentrated share ownership, ceteris
paribus.
Audit committee size (SAC) and frequency of
meetings (MAC)
Board monitoring is a function of not only the
structure and composition of the board, but also of
the board’s subcommittees where much of the im-
portant processes and decisions are monitored and
taken (Cotter and Silvester, 2003). The role of
audit committees has developed over the years to
meet the challenges of changing business, social
and economic environments. The Smith Report
(2003) in the UK identifies the role of audit com-
mittees as ensuring that the interests of sharehold-
ers are properly protected in relation to financial
reporting and internal control. It further recom-
mends audit committees to review the significant
financial reporting issues and judgments made in
connection with the preparation of the company’s
financial statements, interim reports, preliminary
announcements and related formal statements,
such as the operating and financial review and the
release of price-sensitive information. As such,
audit committees can be expected to have a signif-
icant impact on value-relevant information disclo-
sure, of which intellectual capital forms a large
element in many firms.
Effective audit committees should improve in-
ternal control and act as a means of attenuating
agency costs (Ho and Wong, 2001), and as a pow-
erful monitoring device for improving value-rele-
vant intellectual capital disclosure. The presence
of an audit committee has been found to be associ-
ated with more reliable financial reporting
140 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
2 Role duality is not common among listed companies since
the majority comply with the recommended code of corporate
governance.
3 However, in voluntary disclosure studies, Haniffa and
Cooke (2002) and Ho and Wong (2001) failed to find any re-
lationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and role
duality.
4 Prior disclosure studies provide mixed evidence.
Cormier et al. (2005) and Brammer and Pavelin (2006) find
significant negative associations between ownership concen-
tration and engagement in environmental reporting practices.
Patelli and Prencipe (2007) find a positive relationship be-
tween share ownership diffusion and voluntary disclosure.
However, Eng and Mak (2003) fail to find any significant as-
sociation between blockholder ownership and voluntary dis-
closure.
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(McMullen, 1996), enhanced quality and in-
creased disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001).
However, Mangena and Pike (2005) find no rela-
tionship between audit committee size and the ex-
tent of voluntary disclosure in interim reports.
Inactive audit committees are unlikely to monitor
management effectively and adequate meeting
time should be devoted to the consideration of
major issues (Olson, 1999). Price Waterhouse
(1993) recommended that audit committees should
hold a minimum of three or four meetings a year
and special meetings when necessary.
Given the increasing importance of intellectual
capital, we expect larger audit committees, meet-
ing more frequently, to have greater influence in
overseeing intellectual capital disclosure practice.
Therefore, our next two hypotheses are as follows:
H4: There is a positive relationship between the
level of intellectual capital disclosure and
audit committee size, ceteris paribus.
H5: There is a positive relationship between the
level of intellectual capital disclosure and
frequency of audit committee meetings, 
ceteris paribus.
Control variables
The length of time a company has been listed on
a capital market (AGE) may be relevant in ex-
plaining the variation of disclosures. Younger list-
ed companies without an established shareholder
base are expected to be more reliant on external
fund raising than more mature companies (Barnes
and Walker, 2006) and have greater need to reduce
scepticism and boost investor confidence (Haniffa
and Cooke, 2002). Hence, we expect a negative re-
lationship between firms’ listing age and level of
intellectual capital disclosure. Profitability (ROA)
may be the result of continuous investment in in-
tellectual capital and firms may engage in higher
disclosure of such information to signal the signif-
icance of their decision in investing in it for long-
term growth in the value of the firm. We therefore
expect a positive relationship between profitability
and level of intellectual capital disclosure. Large
firms are more visible and more likely to meet in-
vestors’ demand for information and we expect a
positive relationship between size of company
(SA) and level of intellectual capital disclosure.
4. Research method
4.1. Sampling design
This study examines intellectual capital disclo-
sure in corporate annual reports of UK fully 
listed companies on the London Stock Exchange
(LSE) for financial year-ends between March 
2004 and February 2005. Firms in seven industry
sectors containing high intellectual capital compa-
nies (Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology, IT,
Telecommunications, Business Services, Media &
Publishing, Banking & Insurance, and Food
Production & Beverage) were selected.5 This pro-
vided us with a population size of 319 companies,
from which a sample size of 100 was selected
(31%). As the number of companies in each indus-
try group is not the same, proportionate stratified
sampling was applied (Moser and Kalton, 1996).
4.2. Development of the research instrument
Content analysis was used to collect the neces-
sary data. An essential element of content analysis
is the selection and development of categories into
which content units can be classified. Various au-
thors (e.g. Sveiby, 1997; Meritum, 2002) suggest
that intellectual capital can be grouped into three
subcategories: (1) Human capital, for example,
staff education, training, experience, knowledge
and skills, (2) Structural capital, covering internal
structures such as R&D, patents, management
processes, and (3) Relational capital, covering ex-
ternal relationships such as customer relations,
brands and reputation. These forms of intellectual
capital can be leveraged to create competitive ad-
vantage and value for stakeholders. However,
Beattie and Thomson (2007) observe that there is
no consensus or precise definition of the con-
stituents of such categories, giving rise to difficul-
ties for annual report preparers and researchers
seeking to quantify intellectual capital disclosure.
Habersam and Piper (2003) argue for a compre-
hensive representation of intellectual capital, in-
cluding metric and non-metric forms, in order to
better discern its different dimensions and degrees
of transparency. They further suggest a fourth in-
tellectual capital category, namely ‘Connectivity
Capital’ linking the other three forms.
The categories and items in our research instru-
ment were drawn from previous literature on intel-
lectual capital definition and classification. The
majority of previous intellectual capital disclosure
studies have adopted or adapted Sveiby’s (1997)
intellectual capital framework, which typically
contains 22–25 items (Beattie and Thomson,
2007). The problem with too few coding cate-
gories is that it potentially increases the likelihood
of random agreement in coding decisions and sub-
sequently results in an overestimation of reliabili-
ty (Milne and Adler, 1999). Similarly, higher
numbers of items in the instrument increase the
complexity (Beattie and Thomson, 2007) and may
potentially increase coding errors (i.e. reliability)
(Milne and Adler, 1999). However, in order to
achieve greater variation and better understanding
of intellectual capital disclosure, we devised a
Vol. 38 No. 2. 2008 141
5 Given the bias towards high intellectual capital industry
sectors, the sample cannot claim to represent the intellectual
capital disclosure practice of all LSE listed UK firms.
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more detailed checklist covering items relating to
the three themes: human capital (HIC), structural
capital (SIC) and relational capital (RIC), captur-
ing information in the forms of text, numerical and
graphical/pictorial. While Guthrie and Petty
(2000) highlight the difficulty in seeking to quan-
tify the qualitative aspects of intellectual capital,
evidence from Habersam and Piper (2003) ques-
tions this view. All items in the designed research
instrument were considered equally applicable and
therefore equally capable of disclosure across all
sample firms in all three formats.
The initial draft of the research instrument with
150 items was pilot tested by one researcher, using
a sample of annual reports (not included in the
final sample). Based on feedback from the pilot
test and discussion with two other researchers, the
instrument was further modified to ensure that it
captured the necessary and desired information for
which it was designed. The research instrument
was reduced to 61 intellectual capital items in
three forms. The operational definitions and cod-
ing rules (see Appendix) were defined by one re-
searcher and checked and agreed by the other two
researchers.
Measurement of dependent variables
Beattie and Thomson (2007) argue that many of
the content analysis research methods adopted in
prior studies for intellectual capital disclosure
measurement lack transparency, specificity, uni-
formity and rigour, and that these deficiencies may
give rise to misleading evidence. In this study,
scoring of the research instrument was performed
manually covering the whole annual report.6
The dependent variable, intellectual capital dis-
closure, is measured using three different metrics:
disclosure index (ICDI) to indicate the variety;
word count (ICWC) to represent the volume; and
word count as a percentage of annual report total
word count (ICWC%) to indicate focus in the an-
nual report. Our approach in scoring the items in
the research instrument for the purpose of the dis-
closure index is essentially dichotomous in that an
item scores one if disclosed and zero, if it is not.7
The intellectual capital disclosure index ICDIj for
each company is calculated based on the disclo-
sure index score formula used in Haniffa and
Cooke (2005) as follows:
where nj = number of items for jth firm, nj = 183(i.e. 61 items in three formats), Xij = 1 if ith item
disclosed, 0 if ith item not disclosed, so that 0 ≤
ICDIj ≤ 1.
The use of a dichotomous procedure in scoring
the instrument for the disclosure index can be crit-
icised because it treats disclosure of one item (re-
gardless of its form or content) as being equal, and
does not indicate how much emphasis is given to a
particular content category. To capture the volume
of intellectual capital content and to partly over-
come the problem of using an index score, this
study introduces another form of measure, namely
intellectual capital word count (ICWC). Words are
the smallest unit of measurement for analysis and
can be expected to provide the maximum robust-
ness to the study in assessing the quantity of dis-
closure (Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990). Using the
same research instrument, and taking ‘phrases’, or
what Beattie and Thomson (2007) term ‘pieces of
information’ as the basis of coding, the number of
words relating to each intellectual capital item in
the checklist was counted and added together to ar-
rive at ICWC for each company. Graphical and
pictorial messages were excluded from the word
count measure.8
Coding under ‘phrases’ and word count avoids
the problem of coding sentences in terms of deci-
sions over dominant themes, and the ‘phrases’ re-
main meaningful in their own right, while enabling
the measuring of the amount of information pro-
vided. Coding annual reports into ‘phrases’ is a
three-stage process involving: (1) selection of sen-
tences containing intellectual capital information;
(2) splitting such sentences into ‘phrases’ and se-
lecting only those relating to intellectual capital;
and (3) coding ‘phrases’ under each relevant
item(s) in the research instrument. Where a
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6 Three coders independently coded the same four annual
reports and Krippendorff’s (1980) alpha was used to test for
reliability as it can account for chance agreement among mul-
tiple coders. The independent scores were all above the mini-
mum 80% threshold for content analysis to be considered
reliable (Riffe et al., 2005) and this was achieved after a sec-
ond round of independently coding another four annual re-
ports. Only one researcher completed the coding for the
remaining 92 annual reports. To aid consistency of scoring, the
research instrument was completed by one researcher, and to
increase reliability of measurement, rescoring was done on a
random selection of 10 firms three months after initial analy-
sis, which confirmed over 90% consistent identification of
content in the annual reports.
7 Many prior intellectual capital disclosure studies have
adopted the dichotomous (0:1) coding scheme in measuring
intellectual capital disclosure, which is mainly for examining
the presence/absence of intellectual capital items (e.g. Guthrie
and Petty, 2000; Brennan, 2001). Some intellectual capital dis-
closure studies used weighted coding schemes, which give 
uneven scores for quantitative and qualitative information
(e.g. Bozzolan, et al., 2003; Sujan and Abeysekera, 2007).
Consistent with Cooke (1989), items were not weighted be-
cause of potential scoring bias and scaling problems.
8 Beattie and Thomson (2007) identify the problems with
word count (such as print size, colour, font variations and dis-
closures in graphs/pictures format), and propose a measure ad-
dressing the differentiation in length and number of sentences
used in expressing similar meanings encountered by coding
sentences.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:53
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
‘phrase’ relates to more than one item in the check-
list and cannot be split, it is then coded under all
the related items and the word count is evenly dis-
tributed across all the items coded. An example is
shown as follows,
‘The trust and confidence of all our stakeholders,
together with our reputation, are among our most
valuable assets.’ (AstraZeneca plc 2004 Annual
report).
The sentence was split into three ‘phrases’: (1)
The trust and confidence of all our stakeholders,
(2) together with our reputation, (3) are among our
most valuable asset. Phrase 1 was coded under ‘re-
lationship with stakeholders’, phrase 2 was coded
under ‘company reputation’ and phrase 3 was
equally distributed between the two items.
Krippendorff (1980) further notes that words are
a preferred measure when it is intended to measure
the amount of total space devoted to a topic and to
ascertain the importance of that topic. Although
word count is not assumed to be representative of
the quality of disclosure, it is assumed to be in-
dicative of the overall responsiveness by corporate
management.9 The greater the number of words re-
lated to intellectual capital being disclosed in rela-
tion to the total number of words in the annual
reports, the greater the emphasis given by man-
agement on intellectual capital information.
Hence, we introduced a third measure, ICWC%,
which is the proportion of intellectual capital word
count to the total word count of the whole annual
report. This measure captures the intellectual cap-
ital focus in the annual report. For example, a firm
with a short annual report may have a low ICDI
and ICWC but a high ICWC%, conveying to the
reader the importance placed by management on
intellectual capital information.
Measurement of independent variables
The independent variables are categorised into
two groups: corporate governance and control
variables. Data are drawn from corporate annual
reports and Thomson Research. Table 1 summaris-
es the operationalisation of both independent and
dependent variables.
4.3. Data analysis
Multiple regression is used to test the relation-
ship between intellectual capital disclosure (based
on each of the three measures) and the various cor-
porate governance and control variables. To iden-
tify potential multicollinearity problems, the
correlations between independent variables were
reviewed and the variance inflation factors (VIF)
computed. In addition, tests were conducted for
normality, based on skewness and kurtosis and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Lilliefors (for goodness of
fit), for all dependent and continuous independent
variables and when normality was a problem, the
data was transformed.10 An analysis of residuals,
plots of the studentised residuals against predicted
values as well as the Q-Q plot were conducted to
test for homoscedasticity, linearity and normality
assumptions. The regression equation is as follows:
ICD = β0 + β1 INEDi + β2 RDUALi
+ β3 SqSCONi + β4 SACi
+ β5 MACi + β6 LnAGEi
+ β7 ROAi + β8 LnSAi + εi
Where,
ICD = Intellectual capital disclosure index
(ICDI), log of intellectual capital
word count (LnICWC), or intellectu-
al capital word count percentage
(ICWC%);
INED = Proportion of independent non-exec-
utive directors on board (proxy for
board composition, %);
RDUAL = 1 if the roles of chairman and CEO
are held by the same person; 0 if oth-
erwise;
SqSCON = Square root of cumulative sharehold-
ing by significant shareholders (i.e.
shareholders holding more than 3% of
total shares outstanding to total shares
outstanding, %);
SAC = Audit committee size (total number
of directors on the audit committee)
(proxy for internal auditing function);
MAC = Frequency of audit committee meet-
ings (total number of audit committee
meetings held within the year to its fi-
nancial year end) (proxy for internal
auditing function);
AGE = Log of length of listing on LSE (list-
ing age);
ROA = Return on assets (proxy for firm per-
formance: profitability);
LnSA = Log of sales (proxy for firm size);
β = parameters;
εi = error term; and
i = the ith observation.
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9 This assumption is based on the belief that management
has editorial control of content when a large number of de-
mands for inclusion of information are likely to exist. Annual
reports are time-consuming and costly to produce, and man-
agement must rationalise the competing demands for space.
As a result space must be allocated on the basis of some per-
ception of the importance of information to report users.
10 The standard tests for skewness and kurtosis revealed that
share concentration, listing age and firm size were not nor-
mally distributed. Appropriate transformations were conduct-
ed to ensure data normality. Listing age and firm size were
transformed using logarithmic transformation, whereas square
root transformation was more effective for share concentra-
tion.
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Table 2 presents the correlation and partial cor-
relation matrices (controlling for log of sales, a
proxy for size).11
It can be seen from both panel A and B of Table 2
that all variables showed significance for at least
one intellectual capital disclosure measure. Table 2,
Panel A reveals that, with the exception of log of
firm size, independent variable associations are all
below 0.30. The VIFs for each independent vari-
able (shown in Table 6) are all less than 2, sug-
gesting that multicollinearity is not a problem.12
Panel B of Table 2 reveals no multicollinearity
among explanatory variables after controlling for
size. It can also be seen from Panel B of Table 2
that board composition (INED) shows significant
association with all measures of intellectual capital
disclosure. Size of audit committee (SAC), fre-
quency of audit committee meetings (MAC), and
share concentration (SqSCON), show highly sig-
nificant (1% and 5% levels) association with ICDI
and log of ICWC, but not with ICWC%. Return on
assets (ROA) and log of listing age (LnAGE) show
significant correlation with ICDI and ICWC% re-
spectively, at the 5% level.
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Table 1
Measurement of dependent and independent variables
Variable Proxy Measurement
Dependent variables
1 ICDI Variety of intellectual Number of items in the research instrument 
capital disclosure disclosed in the annual report divided by 183
2 ICWC Volume of intellectual Total number of words disclosed in relation to 
capital disclosure intellectual capital information in the annual report
3 ICWC% Focus of intellectual Intellectual capital disclosure word count divided 
capital disclosure by total word count of the annual report
Independent variables
Corporate governance factors
1 Board Independent non-executive Number of independent non-executive directors 
composition directors (INED) on board (specified in the annual reports) divided 
by total number of directors on board
2 Ownership Share concentration (SCON) Cumulative shareholdings by individuals or 
structure organisations classified as substantial shareholders
(currently a 3% stake required by the Companies 
Act 1985), with exception of significant directors’
shareholding, to the total number of outstanding 
common shares
3 Internal auditing Size of audit committee Number of directors on board in audit committee
mechanism (SAC)
4 Internal auditing Frequency of audit Number of audit committee meetings held within 
mechanism committee meetings (MAC) the financial year of the annual report 
5 Role duality Combined role of chairman Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the roles of 
and CEO (RDUAL) chairman and CEO are held by the same person
Control variables
6 Length of listing Listing age (AGE) Number of days listed scaled by 365 days a year
on LSE 
7 Performance: Return on assets (ROA) Return/total assets for the financial year of the 
profitability annual report 
8 Firm size Sales (SA) Sales revenue of financial year
11 Due to the significant effect of size on disclosure, the par-
tial correlation (controlling for size) was considered to be
more appropriate for identifying the marginal effects of other
factors that were significantly correlated to level of intellectu-
al capital disclosure.
12 Previous authors suggest multicollinearity becomes a se-
rious problem where correlations exceed 0.8 or VIFs exceed
10 (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Further, the condition indexes,
using eigenvalues of the independent variables correlation ma-
trix, were also acceptable with all being below 20.
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5. Results
5.1. Descriptive analysis of intellectual capital
disclosure
Table 3 presents the results of the descriptive
analysis of intellectual capital disclosure by each
of the 61 items in the checklist under three cate-
gories in various formats. The most frequently dis-
closed human capital items in text form are
number of employees, employee motivation,
work-related competence, and other employee fea-
tures. Other commonly disclosed human capital
items include employee relationship, entrepreneur-
ial spirit, development and training, work-related
knowledge, employee age, equality, relation,
skills, and commitment. Human capital items least
disclosed are vocational qualifications, employee
productivity and flexibility. In all three formats,
the most disclosed structural capital items are busi-
ness process, technology, R&D, management phi-
losophy, overall infrastructure and distribution
network. The strategic importance of customer and
supply chain relationships in intellectual capital
disclosure is evidenced by the most disclosed
items being customers, relationship with suppliers
and stakeholders, market presence, customer rela-
tionships and market leadership, with over 90% of
sampled firms having disclosures of such items.
5.2. Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of each measure of intel-
lectual capital disclosure, at both overall and sub-
category levels, and the independent variables for
the sample companies are shown in Table 4.
The mean index (ICDI) is 0.36 with slight varia-
tion in the variety of human, structural and rela-
tional capital disclosure, and the mean aggregate
word count (ICWC) is 10,488 words, accounting
for 26.3% of the overall annual report word count
(ICWC%). ICDI ranges from 0.16 to 0.56; ICWC
ranges from 1,234 to 51,430 words and ICWC%
ranges from 8.9% to 42.6%.13
The rankings of means for human, structural and
relational capital disclosure change according to
the disclosure measure employed. Structural capi-
tal ranks highest (37%) for the disclosure index
score, relational capital ranks highest in terms of
word count, while structural capital and relational
capital are joint highest for focus, each forming
9% of the total annual report word count. In all
cases, human capital is in third place, although not
far behind the other two. The relational-structural-
human ranking for word count (38%, 34% and
28% of total intellectual capital respectively) is
consistent with findings from prior intellectual
capital disclosure studies (e.g. Guthrie and Petty,
2000; Bozzolan et al., 2003; Goh and Lim, 2004;
Vandemaele et al., 2005), demonstrating systemat-
ic differences in the level of reporting on intellec-
tual capital elements. If firms focus on the
disclosure of those intellectual capital elements
that are most value and stakeholder relevant
(Vergauwen et al., 2007), relational capital would
seem to be most important in this regard.
The means of corporate governance variables for
sample firms indicate that less than half of the
board in our sample consists of independent non-
executive directors (INED). The mean for the cu-
mulative significant shareholdings (excluding
significant directors’ shareholding) is 30%. The
majority (86%) have three or more directors in the
audit committee, suggesting compliance with rec-
ommended best practice. In addition, the median
for the audit committee meeting frequency is four
times per year, with 83% of sample companies
meeting three or more times during the financial
year, in line with the Price Waterhouse (1993) rec-
ommendation.
The results for intellectual capital disclosure by
the three formats (text, number, graph/picture) are
shown in Table 5. It can be seen that human, struc-
tural and relational capitals are disclosed in all
three forms in the sample annual reports. Only for
structural capital in text form do we observe all
possible items disclosed. On average, 43 (70%) of
the 61 intellectual capital items in the research in-
strument have text disclosures. This falls to 29%
disclosure in numerical form, and 8% in graph/
picture form, although one firm had one-third of
its intellectual capital disclosure in graph/picture
form.
Our results confirm that intellectual capital dis-
closures are still mainly in text form, in line with
previous studies (e.g. Guthrie and Petty, 2000;
Brennan, 2001). The extensive use of numerical
information in intellectual capital disclosure iden-
tified in the study is encouraging, supporting the
finding of Sujan and Abeysekera (2007).
5.3. Regression results
Table 6 summarises the multiple regression re-
sults for all three intellectual capital disclosure
measures.
The first panel reports the multiple regression re-
sults for the ICDI model, producing an adjusted R2
of 62%. With the exception of role duality
(RDUAL), all corporate governance factors exam-
ined are significant: size of audit committee (SAC)
at the 1% level, and board composition (INED),
frequency of audit committee meetings (MAC)
and square root of share concentration (SqSCON)
at the 5% level. Firm size (LnSA) is significant at
the 1% level. Results also show positive relation-
ship between ROA and ICDI, while log of listing
age (LnAGE) is negatively associated, both signif-
146 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
13 Given that previous studies have adopted different re-
search instruments, it is not possible to make meaningful com-
parison.
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Table 5
Descriptive statistics for intellectual capital disclosure by category under three formats
Intellectual capital Max 
categories Format Min Max possible Mean % SD
Human capital Text 9 20 22 15.87 72 2.44
Numbers 3 12 22 6 27 2.11
Graphs/pictures 0 8 22 1.54 7 1.33
All 14 37 66 23.41 35 4.82
Structural capital Text 5 18 18 13.21 73 2.49
Numbers 1 12 18 5.42 30 2.30
Graphs/pictures 0 6 18 1.42 8 1.49
All 7 31 54 20.05 37 4.99
Relational capital Text 3 20 21 13.52 64 3.33
Numbers 1 15 21 7.05 34 3.35
Graphs/pictures 0 10 21 2.41 11 2.43
All 7 42 63 22.98 36 7.67
Intellectual capital Text 19 57 61 42.6 70 7.07
Numbers 7 38 61 17.44 29 6.95
Graphs/pictures 0 20 61 4.91 8 5.00
All 29 103 183 66.44 36 15.52
icant at the 5% level.
The second panel reveals that the log of ICWC
(LnICWC) regression model, with an adjusted R2
of 67%, yields even stronger associations than the
ICDI model. Results show highly significant (1%
level) relationships between LnICWC and four of
the five corporate governance factors examined,
i.e. INED, SAC, MAC and SqSCON. However,
unlike the ICDI model, ROA and LnAGE are not
significant. LnSA is still significant at the 1%
level.
The explanatory power of the ICWC% model is
weaker (adjusted R2 of 11.2%), as shown in the
third panel. INED and LnAGE show significant
associations at the 5% level, with SqSCON show-
ing a weak relationship (10% level). All other cor-
porate governance factors are insignificant, but in
the direction predicted. Neither LnSA nor ROA is
related to ICWC%.
Table 7 presents a summary of multiple regres-
sion results for each of the three intellectual capi-
tal subcategories based on the word count metric:
LnHICWC (log of human capital word count);
LnSICWC (log of structural capital word count);
and LnRICWC (log of relational capital word
count).18
We observe that the two audit committee vari-
ables (SAC and MAC) are significantly associated
with all three intellectual capital subcategories,
confirming our hypothesis of the role these com-
mittees play in influencing the level of intellectual
capital disclosure in its various forms. In addition,
relational capital disclosures are significantly as-
sociated with INED and SqSCON; structural capi-
tal disclosures are significantly associated with
INED, while human capital disclosures are associ-
ated with RDUAL, all in the direction hypothe-
sised.
5.4. Examination of hypotheses
Table 8 summarises the associations between the
independent variables and intellectual capital dis-
closure measures, namely, variety (ICDI), volume
(ICWC) and focus (ICWC%).
Board composition was expected to be one of
the major corporate governance determinants for
intellectual capital disclosure. The significant pos-
itive results of all three measures of intellectual
capital disclosure, especially for variety (5% level)
and volume (1% level), support our hypothesis
(H1) that the greater the presence of independent
non-executive directors on the board, the greater
the intellectual capital disclosure. Detailed analy-
sis at item level (not included) reveals that firms
with more independent non-executive directors
disclose significantly more human capital items
(e.g. employee relations and work-related compe-
tence, but not diversity or equality), structural cap-
ital items (e.g. management philosophy, corporate
culture, innovation, knowledge-based infrastruc-
ture, and quality management and improvement),
and relational capital items (e.g. market presence,
relationships with suppliers, business agreements,
and marketing issues). They offer support to argu-
ments based on both agency and resource depend-
ence theories.
18 The ICDI models for each of the three intellectual capital
subcategories reveals broadly similar associations and are not
therefore presented.
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Role duality was not found to influence intellec-
tual capital disclosure and our hypothesis (H2) was
rejected. Share ownership concentration showed
significant negative associations with all three
measures of intellectual capital disclosure as hy-
pothesised, especially by variety (5% level) and
volume (1% level). The finding supports our hy-
pothesis (H3) that companies with more concen-
trated share ownership are less responsive to
investors’ information costs, since the dominant
shareholders typically have regular access to the
information they require and hence there is less
pressure for intellectual capital disclosure in annu-
al reports. Analysis at intellectual capital subcate-
gory level reveals that the impact of block
shareholders is mainly on the volume of relational
capital disclosure (e.g. customers, market presence
and leadership, customer relationship and acquisi-
tion, company awards, public relation, distribution
channel, relationship with suppliers and stakehold-
ers, business collaboration and marketing).
Audit committee size was found to be positively
Vol. 38 No. 2. 2008 151
Table 7
Multiple regression results for human, structural and relational capital disclosure based on word count
LnHICWC LnSICWC LnRICWC
VIF t Sig. t Sig. t Sig.
(Constant) 28.717 0.000 16.177 0.000 14.041 0.000
SAC 1.381 5.121 0.000 2.924 0.004 3.437 0.001
MAC 1.374 2.497 0.014 2.482 0.015 2.326 0.022
INED 1.104 1.538 0.128 3.239 0.002 2.785 0.007
SqSCON 1.242 –1.299 0.197 –1.647 0.103 –3.272 0.002
RDUAL 1.084 –2.030 0.045 –0.787 0.433 –1.067 0.289
LnAGE 1.183 –2.111 0.038 –0.116 0.908 –2.045 0.044
ROA 1.084 0.502 0.617 0.939 0.350 1.532 0.129
LnSA 1.916 5.040 0.000 2.449 0.016 3.728 0.000
R2 0.685 0.536 0.633
Adj. R2 0.657 0.495 0.601
Std. error 0.339 0.554 0.631
F value 24.733 13.153 19.625
Sig. F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 8
Summary of multiple regression results
Hypothesis support
Predicted Actual  ICDI LnICWC ICWC % 
Hypotheses sign sign (variety) (volume) (focus)
Board composition (H1) + + Moderate Strong Moderate
Role duality (H2) – – None None None
Share concentration (H3) – – Moderate Strong Weak
Audit committee size (H4) + + Strong Strong None
Frequency of audit
committee meetings (H5) + + Moderate Strong None
Listing age – – Moderate None Moderate
ROA + + Moderate None None
Sales + + Strong Strong None
Strong = significant at .01 level, Moderate = significant at .05 level, Weak = significant at .10 level
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associated with ICDI and LnICWC, supporting
our hypothesis (H4) that companies with larger
audit committees tend to provide greater intellec-
tual capital disclosure in their annual reports. This
is in line with the recommendations of the Smith
Report (2003) that audit committees have respon-
sibility to oversee documents such as the operating
and financial review. This document typically has
a strong intellectual capital disclosure emphasis.
Results support hypothesis (H5) that a positive re-
lationship exists between level of intellectual cap-
ital disclosure and frequency of audit committee
meetings. This suggests that audit committee 
activity is an important factor in monitoring man-
agement behaviour with regard to reducing infor-
mation asymmetry through intellectual capital
disclosure.
6. Summary and conclusions
Results based on multiple regression models for
the three intellectual capital disclosure measures
indicate that, with the exception of role duality, all
corporate governance variables together with firm
size, profitability and listing age are associated
with one or more of the intellectual capital disclo-
sure measures. This is consistent with Keenan and
Aggestam’s (2001) argument, previously untested,
that corporate governance impacts on efficient 
intellectual capital management, including its
communication to stakeholders. The significant
positive association for board composition pro-
vides evidence for independent directors’ function
as a monitoring mechanism, which enhances the
effectiveness of the board and reduces both agency
costs and information asymmetries between prin-
cipals and agents. Moreover, their breadth of ex-
pertise and knowledge heighten the board’s
awareness of the importance of intellectual capital
disclosure, especially structural and relational cap-
ital. We also find confirmation of our share con-
centration, audit committee size and frequency of
audit committee meetings hypotheses, under-
pinned by agency theory arguments. Where share
ownership is highly concentrated, smaller share-
holders’ interests in relation to intellectual capital
need to be protected via corporate governance
mechanisms, such as greater independence of the
board and larger, more active audit committees for
better intellectual capital communication.
We argue that, as well as the variety and volume
of disclosure, it is meaningful to measure each
firm’s disclosure focus (ICWC%) to examine the
proportion of annual reports devoted to intellectu-
al capital. On average, 26% of annual report dis-
closures were devoted to intellectual capital; this
focus is not size dependent and is greater where
firms have a higher proportion of independent
non-executive directors and shareholdings are
more widely spread.
Our findings indicate that, in the absence of
mandatory disclosure, effective corporate gover-
nance mechanisms impact positively on the vari-
ety, volume (word count) and format (text,
numbers, graphs/pictures) of intellectual capital
disclosure. Future research could usefully explore
the relationships identified in the study in greater
depth through organisational case studies.
There are several limitations in this study. First,
the disclosure scoring sheet is self-developed,
which causes difficulty for comparison with prior
studies. Second, the study focuses only on corpo-
rate annual reports and future studies may consid-
er other media. Third, there will be other factors
that affect companies’ intellectual capital disclo-
sure practices that have not been examined in this
study.19 Finally, the study has not attempted to in-
clude corporate culture. For example, companies
that choose to have good disclosure policies may
also choose to operate good corporate governance
practices.
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Appendix
Definition and nature of information
Human capital
1 Number of employees Employee count of a firm, employee breakdown by, e.g. market (business 
operation or geographical segments), department and job function, and 
information about its changes and reasons for such changes.
2 Employee age Biological age of employees in the firm. Includes qualitative description of
age-related advantages/strengths of a company’s employees, and indicators
such as average age of a company’s employees and age distribution. 
3 Employee diversity Diversity is defined as the division of classes among a certain population. 
The item refers to the mix of, e.g. ethnicity, gender, colour, and sexual 
orientation. Relevant disclosures include employee diversity policy, the 
mix and breakdown of employee by race, religion, and culture.
4 Employee equality Equal treatment of people irrespective of social and cultural differences.
Related disclosures include employee equality policy and initiatives taken 
for enforcement, senior management by gender, and percentage of disabled
employees.
5 Employee relationship The recognition of importance of employees, employee appreciation, 
dependence on key employees, employee satisfaction, loyalty, Health 
& Safety and working environment. It also includes initiatives to build and
improve employee relationship, e.g. trade union activities, promotion in share
ownership and employee contractual relationships.
6 Employee education Education of directors as well as other employees. Employees’ professional
recognition is classified under employee work-related competences.
7 Skills/know-how Disclosures can be description of knowledge, know-how, expertise or skills 
of directors and other employees. Matrices could also be shown indicating
number of employees with such skills, etc.
8 Employee work-related The knowledge and skills that can be useful to accomplish jobs. It refers to, 
competences e.g. current positions held outside the company by directors, professional
recognition/qualification, awards won (external), and employee publications.
9 Employee work-related What is acquired during the job in terms of tacit, explicit and implicit 
knowledge knowledge. It mainly relates to knowledge that employees have related 
to their current job description, including employees’ previous working 
experiences.
10 Employee attitudes/ It reflects how employees are working. Relevant disclosures could be, e.g. 
behaviour employee friendliness, welcoming, hard working, optimism, enthusiasm, and
identification of individuals with company’s goals.
11 Employee commitments It refers to employees being bound emotionally/intellectually to the 
organisation. It covers, e.g. description of employee commitments, employee
commitment matrix/index, and indicators such as attendance of meetings.
12 Employee motivation Policies, initiatives and evidence of motivation of directors and other 
employees. It includes reward (internal) and incentives systems, e.g. 
employee explicit recognition, performance/psychometric/occupational 
assessment, and indicators of such as employee turnover,20 stability, absence,
and seniority. 
13 Employee productivity21 It is typically measured as output per employee or output per labour-hour, an
output which could be measured in physical terms or in price terms. It shows
the value added and efficiency of employees. Indicators include, e.g. employee
value added, revenue or customers per employee.
20 Information about directors’ retirement is not included as employee turnover.
21 Directors’ achievements based on incentive schemes are classified as employee motivation information rather than em-
ployee productivity. It is considered more appropriate to reflect on the motivational effectiveness of incentive schemes.
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Appendix
Definition and nature of information (continued)
14 Employee training It includes, e.g. training policies, training programmes, training time, 
attendance, investment in training, number of employees trained per period,
and training results/effectiveness/efficiency.
15 Vocational qualifications It refers to education, managed and monitored by trade and professional 
organisations (Brooking, 1996), received by an employee for a particular 
vocation that proves the skill, knowledge and understanding he/she has to 
do a job well. 
16 Employee development22 Employee career development. Disclosures include employee development
policies and programmes (e.g. succession planning), recruitment policies 
(e.g. internal promotion). Indicators include change of employee seniority,
and rate of internal promotion.
17 Employee flexibility Strategies used by employers to adapt the work of employees to their 
production/business cycles; and a method to enable workers to adjust working
life and working hours to their own preferences. For example,
temporary/fixed-term contracts, relaxed hiring and firing regulations, 
adjustable working hours or schedules (e.g. part-time, flexible working
hours/shifts, working time accounts, leave, and overtime), outsourcing, 
job rotation, tele/home-workers, outworkers. 
18 Entrepreneurial spirit It refers to, e.g. employee engagement (e.g. employee suggestion systems/
consultations, rate of employee suggestions acceptance), empowerment 
(responsibility taking), creativity (e.g. valuing creativity, tolerance of creative
people), innovativeness, knowledge sharing, and employee proactive/reactive
ability. 
19 Employee capabilities Other employee abilities apart from the above discussed, e.g. communication
ability, interpersonal ability, sensitivity (e.g. thoughtful), reflexibility, and
management quality.
20 Employee teamwork Teamwork is the concept of people working together cooperatively. It covers
information about culture of teamwork (expert teams and networks, teamwork
capacity), programmes that enhance relationships between employees within/
across departments.
21 Employee involvement Employee social competence can be reflected by their involvement with 
with community community. It is defined as providing employees opportunities for contact
with an often concealed but significant part of the firm’s stakeholders.
22 Other employee features It refers to the special display or attraction of, or gives special prominence to,
employees of the firm, e.g. photographs of employees, other employee profile
information (e.g. positions held).
Structural capital
1 Intellectual property It is a term that encompasses patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, 
licenses, commercial rights and other related fields. It covers the assets of a
company which is protected by law. 
2 Process It normally refers to a company’s management (sales tools, company 
co-operation forms, corporate specialisation, operational or administrative
processes). It includes utilisation of organisation resources, processes/ 
procedures / routines, and documentations which enables the company or 
employees to follow. Indicators are, e.g. efficiency, effectiveness, and 
productivity.
3 Management philosophy ‘The way leaders in the firm think about the firm and its employees’
(Brooking, 1996: 62), i.e. the way a firm’s managed. 
22 Not formal qualifications as degrees.
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Appendix
Definition and nature of information (continued)
4 Corporate culture The set of key values, beliefs, attitudes and understanding shared by people
and groups in an organisation, which controls the way members of the 
organisation interact with each other and with other stakeholders. It covers 
information about, e.g. description of the firm’s corporate culture and value,
stories and myths that build up about people, events and history conveying a
message about what is valued within a firm.
5 Organisation flexibility A company’s ability to face challenges and changes, such as specific 
processes firms use to alter their resource base. 
6 Organisation structure Reporting lines, hierarchies, and the way that work flows through the 
business, including management structure and business models. 
7 Organisation learning A characteristic of an adaptive organisation. It covers what firms learn from
experience and incorporate the learning as feedback into their planning
process. 
8 Research & It refers to future-oriented, longer-term activities in business practice, which 
development (R&D) can achieve higher levels of knowledge and improvement in business 
practice, allowing the organisation to exploit competitive advantages. It 
includes, e.g. R&D policies, programmes, planning, progress, budgets, 
successful rate, rate of peer-reviewed publications. 
9 Innovation Defined as the successful implementation of creative ideas within a firm by
introducing something new and useful (radical or incremental changes to
products, processes or services).
10 Technology A collection of techniques, which is the current state of humanity’s 
knowledge of how to combine resources to produce desired products, to 
solve problems, fulfil needs, or satisfy wants. It includes machines, 
IT (e.g. computer hardware and software), IS (e.g. SAP, PeopleSoft, 
database), technical methods, and techniques. 
11 Financial dealings Defined as the favourable relationships the firm has with investors, banks and
other financiers, financial ratings, financial facilities available, and listings.
12 Customer support Functions for customer support, such as customer support centres (e.g. call 
function centres) and other related activities and programmes.
13 Knowledge-based It includes, e.g. documented materials (e.g. shared database) that a firm shares 
infrastructure amongst employees, facilities or centres (knowledge centres, laboratories) for
training & learning, and knowledge management and sharing programmes/
policies/facilities.
14 Quality management Practices in maintaining and improving quality standards of products and 
& improvement services. Information considered relevant includes, e.g. policies and 
objectives, programmes, control activities (e.g. TQM), description of quality 
performance, and existence of quality committee.
15 Accreditations A process in which certification of competency, authority, or credibility is 
(certificate) presented. It has been broadly referred to as quality certificates. ‘Investor in 
people’ accreditation represents a firm’s commitment to its employees; hence
classified under employee relationship.
16 Overall infrastructure/ Infrastructure/capabilities of a firm that cannot be classified under the other 
capability 17 structural capital items. Where acquisitions are stated to add a firm’s 
capability of products and services provision, such information is included
under this item.
17 Networking The systems available in a firm that allows interaction of people via a broad
array of communication media and devices, e.g. voicemail, e-mail, voice or
video conferencing, the internet, groupware and corporate intranets, personal
digital assistants, and newsletters.
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Appendix
Definition and nature of information (continued)
18 Distribution network Internal networks of distribution, such as distribution centres. It is what a
company owns and forms a very essential part of the business supply chain.
Relational capital
1 Customers General customer information, e.g. type of customers, customer names, 
reputation of customers, customer base, knowledge of markets/customers, and
customer purchasing histories. 
2 Market presence It covers target markets of a firm, geographically or by market segmentation,
percentage of sales represented by each market segment, and market share. 
3 Customer relationships It includes policies and programmes for building customer relationships (e.g.
customer loyalty schemes, customer satisfaction survey and the initiatives
taken for improvement, complaints management), current relationships with
customers (e.g. customer satisfaction and loyalty, customer recommendation,
recognition of dependence on key customers, customer perception (e.g. 
expressed by direct quotes), and various activities/indicators that enhance 
customer relationships, such as on-time deliveries, convenience of returning
goods, value for money). 
4 Customer acquisition It refers to a company’s new customers/contracts (unless identified as
favourite contracts). It also includes a company’s effort on acquiring new or
more customers, such as investments/costs. 
5 Customer retention It focuses on retaining the existing customers. Relevant information includes
e.g. the number of repeated customers/contracts, renewed contracts, backlog
orders, and customer repurchase.
6 CTE Customer training & education (CTE), such as presentation, road shows, 
exhibitions, etc.
7 Customer involvement It focuses on customer consultation on product or services development,
which could also include customer and company connectivity.
8 Company image/ It refers to the evaluation/perception of a firm by its stakeholders in terms of 
reputation their effect, esteem, and knowledge, and what a company stand for. 
9 Company awards It includes awards to a company which is not specifically to other aspects,
such as innovation or employees. 
10 Public relation It is the managing of outside communication of an organisation to create 
and maintain a positive image. Public relations involve, e.g. popularising 
successes and downplaying failures. 
11 Diffusion & networking It includes taking part in social events, courses, conferences, lectures, or other
presentations or seminars. 
12 Brands23 Information about, e.g. brand names, brand images, brand awareness, brand
loyalty (e.g. word of mouth advocacy), brand-building strategies and 
activities, and brand-related sales.
13 Distribution channels Defined as appropriate mechanisms of getting products and services into the
market (Brooking, 1996). It refers to various third party distribution channels,
e.g. distributors, agents, dealers. 
14 Relationship with It includes, e.g. knowledge of suppliers, relationships with them (such as 
suppliers reliance on key suppliers, bargaining power against suppliers, support of 
suppliers, and payment terms).
23 Brands have been classified under relational capital in various studies (e.g. Bozzolan et al., 2003; Brennan, 2001;
Guthrie and Petty, 2000). Although authors such as Rodgers (2003) consider brands as a structural capital item, it is con-
sidered in this study that brands themselves are not able to create value for firms and it is the attachment of the market and
customers, and the positive perception consumers have relating to the brand that lead to purchase decisions and add value
to the firm.
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Appendix
Definition and nature of information (continued)
15 Business collaboration Collaborations established with other business partners. It covers issues such
as strategic alliances, joint venture and partnership for the purpose of working
together to improve effectiveness and efficiency by combining each other’s
advantages.
16 Business agreements It includes such as licensing and franchising agreements. However, the 
transactions are not within a consolidated group of companies. 
17 Favourite contract A contract obtained because of the unique market position held by the firm
(Brooking, 1996). It includes description of the contract and the favourable
relationships.
18 Research collaboration Collaborations with scientific associations or institutions (e.g. schools and
universities) for research or development purposes for the benefit of the 
company or the community. 
19 Marketing It includes, e.g. marketing initiatives, investments, strategies, capabilities, and
effects (e.g. awareness raised or sales created).
20 Relationship with A firm’s relationship with stakeholders, which cannot be covered by 
stakeholders relationship with customers, suppliers and shareholders, e.g. community, 
government, and competitors. 
21 Market leadership A firm’s leadership in various markets or top positions. Market share 
supplementing market leadership statement is also included.
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